The TV is Smart and Full of Trackers: Towards Understanding the Smart TV
  Advertising and Tracking Ecosystem by Varmarken, Janus et al.
Janus Varmarken*, Hieu Le, Anastasia Shuba, Zubair Shafiq, and Athina Markopoulou
The TV is Smart and Full of Trackers
Towards Understanding the Smart TV Advertising and Tracking Ecosystem
Abstract: Motivated by the growing popularity of smart
TVs, we present a large-scale measurement study of smart
TVs by collecting and analyzing their network traffic from two
different vantage points. First, we analyze aggregate network
traffic of smart TVs in-the-wild, collected from residential
gateways of tens of homes and several different smart TV plat-
forms, including Apple, Samsung, Roku, and Chromecast. In
addition to accessing video streaming and cloud services, we
find that smart TVs frequently connect to well-known as well
as platform-specific advertising and tracking services (ATS).
Second, we instrument Roku and Amazon Fire TV, two pop-
ular smart TV platforms, by setting up a controlled testbed to
systematically exercise the top-1000 apps on each platform,
and analyze their network traffic at the granularity of the in-
dividual apps. We again find that smart TV apps connect to
a wide range of ATS, and that the key players of the ATS
ecosystems of the two platforms are different from each other
and from that of the mobile platform. Third, we evaluate the
(in)effectiveness of state-of-the-art DNS-based blocklists in
filtering advertising and tracking traffic for smart TVs. We find
that personally identifiable information (PII) is exfiltrated to
platform-related Internet endpoints and third parties, and that
blocklists are generally better at preventing exposure of PII
to third parties than to platform-related endpoints. Our work
demonstrates the segmentation of the smart TV ATS ecosys-
tem across platforms and its differences from the mobile ATS
ecosystem, thus motivating the need for designing privacy-
enhancing tools specifically for each smart TV platform.
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1 Introduction
Smart TV adoption has steadily grown over the last few years,
with more than 37% of US households with at least one smart
TV in 2018 which is a 16% increase over 2017 [1]. The growth
in smart TV is driven by two trends. First, over-the top (OTT)
video streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu have be-
come quite popular, with more than 60 million and 28 million
subscribers in the US, respectively [2]. Second, smart TV so-
lutions are available at relatively affordable prices, with many
of the external smart TV boxes/sticks priced less than $50 and
built-in smart TVs priced on the order of hundreds of dollars
[3]. A diverse set of platforms, each with their own app store,
are used by different smart TV products such as tvOS (Apple),
Roku (Roku, TCL, Sharp), Android (Sony, Fire TV), Smart-
Cast/Cast (Vizio, Chromecast), webOS (LG), etc.
The vast majority of smart TV apps are ad-supported [4].
OTT advertising, which includes smart TV, is expected to in-
crease by 40% to $2 billion in 2018 [5]. Roku and Fire TV
are two of the leading smart TV platforms in number of ad
requests [6]. Despite their increasing popularity, the advertis-
ing and tracking services (“ATS”) on smart TV is currently not
well understood by users, researchers, and regulators. In this
paper, we present a large-scale study of the smart TV advertis-
ing and tracking (ATS) ecosystem.
In the Wild Measurements (§3). First, we analyze the net-
work traffic of smart TV devices in-the-wild. We instrument
residential gateways of 41 homes and collect flow-level sum-
mary logs of the network traffic generated by 57 smart TVs
from 7 different platforms. The comparative analysis of net-
work traffic by different smart TV platforms uncovers similar-
ities and differences in their characteristics. As expected, we
find that a substantial fraction of the traffic is related to pop-
ular video streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu. More
importantly, we find generic as well as platform-specific ad-
vertising and tracking services. Although realistic, the in-the-
wild dataset does not provide app-level visibility, i.e. we can-
not determine which apps generate ATS traffic. To address this
limitation, we undertake the following major effort.
Controlled Testbed Measurements (§4). We instrument and
systematically study two popular smart TV platforms in a
controlled environment. Specifically, we design and imple-
ment Rokustic for Roku and Firetastic for Amazon Fire TV
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for systematically exercising apps and collecting their net-
work traffic. Using our tools, we analyze the top-1000 apps
on Roku and Fire TV, w.r.t. the top destinations contacted
by those apps, at the granularity of fully qualified domain
names (FQDNs), effective second level domains (eSLDs), and
organizations. We use “domain (name)” or “endpoint” inter-
changably in place of FQDN and eSLD. We further distin-
guish between first-party, third-party, and platform destina-
tions, w.r.t. to the app that contacted them. First, we find that
certain platform-specific ATS, such as logs.roku.com for Roku
and amazon-adsystem.com for Fire TV, are used by the vast
majority of apps. We also observe several third-party ATS,
such as doubleclick.net and scorecardresearch.com, which are
prevalent across many apps. Second, we find that the same
apps across different platforms (Roku vs. Fire TV) have lit-
tle overlap in terms of the endpoints they contact, which high-
lights the segmentation of smart TV platforms. Third, we com-
pare the smart TV platforms’ ATS ecosystems to that of An-
droid [7], and identify differences in terms of their key players.
Evaluation of DNS-Based Blocklists (§5). Since it is typi-
cally not viable to directly install ad/tracker blocking apps on
smart TV platforms, smart TV users have to rely on DNS-
based blocking solutions such as Pi-hole [8]. We are inter-
ested in evaluating the effectiveness of well-known DNS-
based blocklists in blocking advertising and tracking (ATS)
domains accessed by different smart TV apps. To that end, we
examine and test four blocklists: (1) Pi-hole Default blocklist
(PD) [8], (2) Firebog’s recommended advertising and tracking
lists (TF) [9], (3) Mother of all Ad-Blocking (MoaAB) [10],
and (4) StopAd’s smart TV specific blocklist (SATV) [11]. Our
comparative analysis shows that block rates vary across dif-
ferent blocklists, with Firebog blocking the most and StopAd
blocking the least. We further evaluate and discuss the false
negatives (FN) and false positives (FP). We find that block-
lists miss different ATS (FN), some of which are missed by all
of the blocklists, while more aggressive blocklists suffer from
FP that result in breaking app functionality. We also identified
many instances of PII exfiltration, not only to third party ATS,
but also to platform-specific endpoints, most of which seem
unrelated to the core functionality of the app. Existing block
lists seem more successful at blocking PII exfiltration to third
parties than to platform-specific endpoints.
Outline and Contributions. The structure of the rest of the
paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on smart
TVs and reviews closely related work. Section 3 presents the
in-the-wild measurement and analysis of 57 smart TVs from
7 different platforms in 41 homes. Section 4 presents the sys-
tematic testing and analysis of the top-1000 Roku and Fire TV
apps. Section 5 evaluates four well-known DNS-based block-
lists and show their limitations, including exfiltration of PIIs.
Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future
work. The appendix provides additional graphs and details.
In summary, we perform a large-scale measurement study
of the smart TV advertising and tracking (ATS) ecosystem.
Our work demonstrates the segmentation across smart TV
platforms, limitations of current DNS-based blocklists and dif-
ferences from mobile ATS. This motivates the need for further
research on developing privacy-enhancing solutions specifi-
cally designed for each smart TV platform. We plan to make
our automated testing tools (Rokustic and Firetastic) and col-
lected datasets available to the community.
2 Background & Related Work
Background on Smart TVs. A smart TV is essentially an
Internet-connected TV that has apps for users to stream con-
tent, play games, and even browse the web. There are two
types of smart TV products in the market: (1) built-in smart
TVs, and (2) external smart TV box/stick. On one hand, TV
manufacturers such as Samsung and Sony now offer TVs with
built-in smart TV functionality. On the other hand, several ex-
ternal box/stick solutions such as Roku (by Roku), Fire TV (by
Amazon), Apple TV (by Apple), and Chromecast (by Google)
are available to convert a regular TV into a smart TV. Some
TV manufacturers have started to integrate external box/stick
solutions into their smart TVs. For example, TCL and Sharp
offer smart TVs that integrate Roku TV while Insignia and
Toshiba offer Fire TV instead within their smart TVs.
There is a diverse set of smart TV platforms, each with
its own set of apps that users can install on their TVs. Many
smart TVs use an Android-based operating system (e.g. Sony,
AirTV, Philips) or a modified version of it (e.g. Fire TV). Reg-
ular Android TVs have access to apps from the Google Play
Store, while Fire TV has its own app store controlled by Ama-
zon. In both cases, applications for such TVs are built in a
manner similar to regular Android applications. Likewise, Ap-
ple TV apps are built using technologies and frameworks that
are also available for iOS apps, and both types of apps can be
downloaded from Apple’s App Store.
Some smart TV platforms are fairly distinct as compared
to traditional Android or iOS. For example, Samsung smart
TV apps are built for their own custom platform called Tizen
and are downloadable from the Tizen app store. Likewise, ap-
plications for the Roku platform are built using a customized
language called BrightScript, and are accessible via the Roku
channel store. Yet another line of smart TVs such as LG smart
TV and Hybrid broadcast broadband TV (HbbTV) follow a
web-based ecosystem where applications are developed using
HTML, CSS, and JavaScript. Finally, some smart TV plat-
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forms do not have app stores of their own, but are only meant
to “cast” content from other devices such as smartphones. For
instance, Chromecast provides users the ability to stream con-
tent from their mobile device or laptop to their TV.
As with mobile apps, smart TV apps can integrate third-
party libraries and services, often for advertising and tracking
purposes. Serving advertisements is one of the main ways for
smart TV platforms and app developers to generate revenue
[4]. Roku and Fire TV are two of the leading ad-supported
smart TV platforms [6]. Roku’s advertising revenue exceeded
$250 million in 2018 and is expected to more than double
by 2020 [12]. Both Roku and Fire TV take 30% cut of the
advertising revenue from apps on their platforms [13]. Smart
TV advertising ecosystem mirrors many aspects of the vanilla
web advertising ecosystem. Most importantly, smart TV ad-
vertising uses programmatic mechanisms that allow apps to
sell their ad inventory in an automated fashion using behav-
ioral targeting [14, 15].
The rapidly growing smart TV advertising and associated
tracking ecosystem has already warranted privacy and security
investigations into different smart TV platforms. Consumer
Reports examined privacy policies of various smart TV plat-
forms including Roku, LG, Sony, and Vizio [16]. They found
that privacy policies are often challenging to understand and it
is difficult for users to opt out of different types of tracking. For
instance, many smart TVs use Automatic Content Recognition
(ACR) to track their users’ viewing data and use it to serve tar-
geted ads [17]. Vizio paid $2.2 million to settle the charges
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that they were using
ACR to track users’ viewing data without their knowledge or
consent [18]. While smart TV platforms now allow users to
opt-out of such tracking, it is not straightforward for users to
turn it off [19]. Further, even with ACR turned off, users still
must agree to a basic privacy policy that asks for the right to
collect data about users’ location, choice of apps, etc.
Related Work. While the desktop [20–22] and mobile [7,
23, 24] ATS ecosystems have been thoroughly studied, the
smart TV ATS ecosystem has not been examined at scale un-
til recently. Concurrently with our work, three other papers
also studied the network behavior and privacy implications
of smart TVs [25–27]. Ren et al. [25] studied a large set of
IoT devices, spanning multiple device categories. Their results
showed that smart TVs were the category of devices that con-
tacted the largest number of third parties, which further mo-
tivates our in-depth study of the smart TV ATS ecosystem.
Huang et al. [26] used crowdsourcing to collect network traf-
fic for IoT devices in the wild and showed that smart TVs con-
tact many trackers by matching the contacted domains against
the Disconnect blocklist. Finally, and most closely related to
our work, Moghaddam et al. [27] also instrumented the Roku
and Fire TV platforms to map the ATS endpoints contacted
by the top-1000 apps of each platform, as well as the expo-
sure of PII. Our work combines the individual merits of these
concurrent works, providing a holistic view of the smart TV
ATS ecosystem by analyzing a total of eight different smart
TV platforms in-the-wild and in-depth in the lab. We further
contribute to this existing literature along two fronts: First, we
show that even the same app across different smart TV plat-
forms contact different ATS, which shows the fragmentation
of the smart TV ATS ecosystem. Second, we evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of different sets of blocklists, including a smart TV
specific blocklist, in terms of their ability to prevent ads as
well as their adverse effects on app functionality. In addition
to blocklist evaluation, we also suggest ways to aid blocklist
curation through analysis of app prevalence and PII exposures.
Earlier work in this space include that of Ghiglieri and
Tews [28], who studied how broadcasting stations could track
viewing behavior of users in the HbbTV platform. In contrast
to the rich app-based platforms we study, the HbbTV plat-
form studied in [28] contained only one HbbTV app that uses
HTML5-based overlays to provide interactive content. Related
to our work, they found that the HbbTV app loaded third-party
tracking scripts from Google Analytics. Malkin et al. [29] sur-
veyed 591 U.S. Internet users about their expectations on data
collection by smart TVs. They found that users would rather
enjoy new technology than worry about privacy, and users thus
over rely on existing laws and regulations to protect their data.
3 Smart TV Traffic in the Wild
Data Collection. To study smart TV traffic characteristics in
the wild, we monitor network traffic of 41 homes in a major
metropolitan area in the United States. We sniff network traffic
Smart Device Average Average Average
TV Count Flow Flow eSLD
Platform Count Volume Count
/Device /Device /Device
(x 1000) (GB)
Apple 16 49.3 46.6 536
Samsung 11 62.6 33.2 369
Chromecast 10 201.9 26.3 354
Roku 9 48.1 83.0 543
Vizio 6 43.4 63.4 278
LG 4 10.9 0.9 189
Sony 1 33.1 0.1 186
Table 1. Traffic statistics of 57 smart TV devices observed across
41 homes (“in-the-wild” dataset).
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0 10k 20k 30k
Number of Flows
insights-collector.newrelic.com
api-global.netflix.com
vortex.hulu.com
home.hulu.com
aeg-personalization.quickplay.com
uwp-aeg-hbs.quickplay.com
http-v-darwin.hulustream.com
occ-1-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
d2lkq7nlcrdi7q.cloudfront.net
cws-us-east.conviva.com
cws-110*57.[2].amazonaws.com
init-p01st.push.apple.com
giga.logs.roku.com
liberty.logs.roku.com
occ-0-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
ichnaea.netflix.com
dtvn-live-sponsored.akamaized.net
midland.logs.roku.com
cws-eu-west-1.conviva.com
cdn-0.nflximg.com
http-e-darwin.hulustream.com
occ-2-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
atv-ext.amazon.com
oca-api.geo.netflix.com
b.scorecardresearch.com
cws.conviva.com
stream.nbcsports.com
tp.akam.nflximg.com
scribe.logs.roku.com
pubads.g.doubleclick.net
(a) Roku
0 10k 20k 30k
Number of Flows
vortex.hulu.com
api-global.netflix.com
cws-us-east.conviva.com
api-global.[1].netflix.com
time-ios.apple.com
e673.e9.akamaiedge.net
play.hulu.com
home.hulu.com
http-v-darwin.hulustream.com
occ-1-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
time-ios.g.aaplimg.com
1-courier.push.apple.com
http-e-darwin.hulustream.com
e1042.b.akamaiedge.net
occ-0-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
itunes.apple.com.edgekey.net
occ-2-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
pt.hulu.com
cws-110*57.[2].amazonaws.com
cws-189*47.[2].amazonaws.com
d2hzeyj6b557bu.cloudfront.net
http-v-[3].footprint.net
t2.hulu.com
init-p01st.push.apple.com
xp.itunes-apple.com.akadns.net
auth.hulu.com
e1042.e12.akamaiedge.net
mt-ingestion-[4].akadns.net
nrdp.nccp.netflix.com
a1910.b.akamai.net
(b) Apple
0 2k 4k
Number of Flows
api-global.netflix.com
mobile-collector.newrelic.com
feed.theplatform.com
hh.prod.sony[6].com
android.clients.google.com
www.fox.com
flingo.tv
ichnaea.netflix.com
pubads.g.doubleclick.net
clients3.google.com
www.lookingglass.rocks
i.ytimg.com
clients4.google.com
play.googleapis.com
artist.api.lv3.cdn.hbo.com
js-agent.newrelic.com
www.googleapis.com
mtalk.google.com
comet.api.hbo.com
occ-0-586-590.1.nflxso.net
profile.localytics.com
connectivitycheck.gstatic.com
occ-1-586-590.1.nflxso.net
assets.fox.com
occ-2-586-590.1.nflxso.net
sp.auth.adobe.com
api.meta.ndmdhs.com
api.fox.com
youtubei.googleapis.com
cdn.meta.ndmdhs.com
(c) Sony
0 50k 100k
Number of Flows
log-ingestion.samsungacr.com
www.youtube.com
api-global.netflix.com
lcprd1.samsungcloudsolution.net
android.clients.google.com
log-2.samsungacr.com
i.ytimg.com
vortex.hulu.com
occ-1-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
youtube-ui.l.google.com
api.twitter.com
clients1.google.com
ypu.samsungelectronics.com
i9.ytimg.com
occ-0-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
nrdp.nccp.netflix.com
ytimg.l.google.com
s.youtube.com
clients4.google.com
video-stats.l.google.com
occ-2-1736-999.1.nflxso.net
osb.samsungqbe.com
t2.hulu.com
ichnaea.netflix.com
http-v-darwin.hulustream.com
upu.samsungelectronics.com
tv.deezer.com
dpu.samsungelectronics.com
ocfconnect-[7].samsungiotcloud.com
googleads.g.doubleclick.net
(d) Samsung
Fig. 1. Top-30 fully qualified domain names in terms of number of flows per device for a subset of the smart TVs in the “in-the-wild”
dataset. See Appendix A for the other brands.
of smart TV devices at the residential gateways using off-the-
shelf OpenWRT-capable commodity routers. We collect flow-
level summary information for network traffic. For each flow,
we collect its start time, FQDN of the external endpoint (us-
ing DNS), and the internal device identifier. We identify smart
TVs using heuristics that rely on DNS, DHCP, and SSDP traf-
fic and also manually verify the identified smart TVs by con-
tacting users. Our data collection covers a total of 57 smart
TVs across 41 homes over the duration of approximately 3
weeks in 2018. Note that we obtained written consent from
users, informing them of our data collection and research ob-
jectives, in accordance with our institution’s IRB guidelines.
Dataset Statistics. Table 1 lists basic statistics of smart TV de-
vices observed in our dataset. Overall, we note 57 smart TVs
from 7 different vendors/platforms using a variety of technolo-
gies such as Apple TV (tvOS), Samsung Smart TV (Tizen),
Google Chromecast (Cast SDK), Roku (standalone TV and
HDMI sticks), Vizio (SmartCast based on Chromecast), LG
Smart TV (webOS), and Sony Smart TV (Android).
These smart TV devices account for substantial traffic
both in terms of number and volume of traffic flows. We in-
deed expect smart TV devices to generate significant traffic
because they are typically used for OTT video streaming [30].
First, we note that all smart TV devices generate tens of thou-
sands of traffic flows on average. Chromecast devices generate
the highest number of flows (exceeding 200 thousand flows)
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on average. Samsung, Apple, Roku, and Vizio devices gener-
ate nearly 50 thousand flows on average. Second, we note a
similar trend for average flow volume. Roku devices gener-
ate the highest volume of flow (exceeding 80 GB) on average,
with one Roku device generating as much as 283 GB. Except
for LG and Sony devices, all smart TV devices generate at
least tens of GBs worth of traffic on average. Finally, we also
note that smart TV devices typically connect to hundreds of
different endpoints on average. As we discuss next, smart TV
devices connect to a variety of endpoints for video streaming
and related functionality.
Endpoint Analysis. Fig. 1 plots the top-30 FQDNs in terms
of flow count for Roku, Apple, Sony, and Samsung smart TV
platforms. The plots for the remaining smart TV platforms
are in Appendix A. We notice several similarities in the do-
mains accessed by different smart TV devices. First, as ex-
pected, we note that popular video streaming services such as
Netflix and Hulu are popular across the board. For example,
domains such as api-global.netflix.com and vortex.hulu.com
appear for different smart TV platforms. Second, we note
that cloud/CDN services such as Akamai and AWS (Ama-
zon) also appear for different smart TV platforms. For ex-
ample, domains such as *.akamai*.net and *.amazonaws.com
appear across most smart TVs. Smart TVs likely connect to
cloud/CDN services because popular video streaming services
such as Netlifx typically rely on third party CDNs [31, 32].
Third, we note the prevalence of well-known advertising and
tracking services (ATS). For example, *.scorecardresearch.
com and *.newrelic.com are well-known third-party tracking
services, and pubads.g.doubleclick.net is a well-known third-
party advertising service.
We notice several platform-specific differences in the do-
mains accessed by different smart TV platforms. For ex-
ample, giga.logs.roku.com (Roku), time-ios.apple.com (Ap-
ple), hh.prod.sonyentertainmentnetwork.com (Sony), and log-
ingestion.samsungacr.com (Samsung) are unique to differ-
ent types of smart TVs. In addition, we notice platform-
specific ATS. For example, the following advertising-related
domains are not in the top-30 (and therefore not pictured
in Fig. 1), but are unique to different smart TV platforms:
p.ads.roku.com (Roku), ads.samsungads.com (Samsung), and
us.info.lgsmartad.com (LG).
Organizational Analysis. To understand the role of different
parent organizations within each smart TV platform, we map
each FQDN to its effective second level domain (eSLD) using
Mozilla’s Public Suffix List [33, 34]. We then use Crunchbase
[35] to find the organization name and follow Crunchbase’s
acquisition and sub-organization information to find the ulti-
mate parent company. For example, hulu.com belongs to the
Walt Disney Company and youtube.com belongs to Alphabet.
Apple TV
Chromecast
LG
Roku
Samsung
Sony Bravia
Vizio
Adobe Systems
AEG
Alphabet
Amazon
Apple
AT&T
Comcast
comScore
Conviva
Deezer
Flingo
Fox
Kodi
LG
Localytics
NBCUniversal Media
Netflix
New Relic
NFL
Roku
Samsung
Sony
Time Warner
Twitter
Unknown/CDN
Verizon
Vizio
Walt Disney Company
Fig. 2. Mapping of platforms measured in-the-wild to the ultimate
parent organizations of the endpoints they contact (for the top-
30 FQDNs of each platform). The width of an edge indicates the
number of distinct FQDNs within that organization that was ac-
cessd by the platform.
Figure 2 illustrates the mix of different parent organizations
contacted by the seven smart TV platforms in our dataset. The
illustration shows the prevalence of Alphabet in smart TV plat-
forms like Chromecast, Sony, Samsung, LG, and Vizio, while
also revealing competing organizations such as Apple on the
other end of the spectrum. The illustration also shows that
Roku and Sony contact a wide range of ATS organizations like
Conviva, Localytics, and Adobe Services.
Takeaway & Limitations. Traffic analysis of different smart
TV platforms in the wild highlights interesting similarities and
differences. As expected, all devices generate traffic related
to popular video streaming services. In addition, they also ac-
cess advertising and tracking services (ATS), both well-known
and platform-specific. While our vantage point at the resi-
dential gateway provides a real-world view of how smart TV
devices behavior, it lacks granular information beyond flows
(e.g., packet-level information) and the specific apps that gen-
erate the traffic. Another limitation of in the wild analysis is
that our findings may be biased by the viewing habits of users
in these 41 households. It is not clear how to normalize our
analysis to provide a fair comparison of endpoints accessed
by different smart TV platforms. We address these limitations
next by systematically analyzing two popular smart TV plat-
forms in a controlled testbed.
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4 Systematic Testing of the
Roku and Fire TV Platforms
In this section, we focus on two of the popular smart TV plat-
forms, namely Roku and Amazon Fire TV. Sections 4.1 and
4.2 present our measurement approach for systematically test-
ing approximately 1000 apps in each platform while collecting
their network traffic1. Our measurement approaches enables
us to automatically test a large number of apps. More impor-
tantly, it provides visibility into the behaviors of individual
apps, which was not possible from the vantage point used for
the in-the-wild dataset in the previous section. In Sections 4.3
and 4.4, we summarize and analyze the two datasets, and com-
pare them to each other as well as to the in-the-wild datasets of
the previous section, and to the Android ATS ecosystem [7].
4.1 Roku Data Collection
In this section, we first present an overview of the Roku plat-
form. Next, we present our app selection method. We then pro-
ceed to describe Rokustic—the software tool we wrote for au-
tomatically exercising Roku apps. The data resulting from ex-
ercising 1044 Roku apps provides insight into what ATS are
most prevalent on the Roku platform.
Roku Platform. We start by describing the Roku TV (re-
ferred to as Roku for the rest of the paper) platform, which
has its own app store that offers more than 8500 apps, called
“channels”. We will use the terms “apps” and “channels” in-
terchangeably for the rest of the paper. For security purposes,
Roku sandboxes each app (apps are not allowed to interact
or access the data of other apps) and provides limited access
to system resources [36]. Furthermore, Roku apps cannot run
in the background. Specifically, app scripts are only executed
when the user selects a particular app, and when the user exits,
the script is halted, and the system resumes control [37].
To display ads, apps typically rely on the Roku Advertis-
ing Framework which is integrated into the Roku SDK [38].
The framework allows developers to use ad servers of their
preference and updates automatically without requiring the
developer to rebuild the app. Even though such a framework
eliminates the need for third party ATS libraries, the develop-
ment and usage of such libraries is still possible. For exam-
ple, the Ooyala IQ SDK [39] provides various analytics ser-
vices that can be integrated into a Roku app. Thus, although
the Roku sandboxes apps, such libraries can help ATS servers
1 Since testing is done automatically, no real users are involved, thus no
IRB is needed.
learn the viewing habits of users by collecting data from mul-
tiple apps. In terms of permissions, Roku only protects micro-
phone access with a permission and does not require any per-
mission to access the advertising ID. Users can choose to reset
this ID and opt-out of targeted advertising at any time [38].
However, apps and libraries can easily create other IDs or use
fingerprinting techniques to continue tracking users even after
opt-out.
App Selection. The Roku Channel Store [40] (RCS) provides
a web interface for browsing the set of available Roku apps,
and allows for “one-click” installation of Roku apps on Roku
devices linked to a Roku user account. To the best of our
knowledge, Roku does not provide any public documentation
on how to query the RCS in a programmatic way. We therefore
reverse-engineered the REST API that provides the data to the
RCS web interface by inspecting the HTTP(S) requests sent
by the browser while manually browsing the RCS. Using this
insight, we wrote a script that crawls the RCS for the metadata
of all Roku apps. The script first issues an API call to fetch all
app categories. Next, for each category, it performs a series of
API calls to determine the app IDs of all apps in that category.
Finally, for each app ID, an API call is made to fetch the full
metadata for that app. At the time of writing, this resulted in a
total of 8,515 different Roku apps.
To ensure that we test the most relevant apps, we selected
the top 50 apps in 30 out of the total 32 categories. We ex-
cluded “Themes” and “Screensavers” since these apps do not
show up among the regular apps on the Roku device and there-
fore cannot be operated using our automation software de-
scribed below. Since statistics for the number of downloads
or installs are not provided by Roku, we based our selection
on the “star rating count”—which we interpret as the review
count—present in the metadata extracted from the RCS. Note
that Roku apps can be labeled with multiple categories, mean-
ing some apps contribute to the top 50 of multiple categories.
Furthermore, some categories contain fewer than 50 apps, a
handful of apps could not be installed due to incompatibility
with the Roku Express (Roku offers a range of more capable
devices), and about a dozen of apps had to be discarded due to
failure during automation. This places the final count of apps
in our dataset at 1044.
Automation (Rokustic). To scale testing of apps, we imple-
ment a software system, Rokustic, that automatically installs
and exercises a given set of Roku apps.
Setup and Network Traffic capture. We run Rokustic on a
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ set up to host a standalone network
as per the instructions given in [41]. The Pi’s wlan0 interface
is configured as a wireless access point with DHCP server and
NAT, and the Roku Express is connected to this local wireless
network. The Pi’s eth0 interface connects the Pi and the Roku
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Express to the WAN. This setup enables us to collect all traffic
going in and out of the Roku Express by running tcpdump
on the Raspberry Pi’s wlan0 interface.
App Exploration. From manual inspection of a few apps
(e.g. YouTube and Pluto TV), we found that playable content
is often presented in a grid, where each cell is a different video
or live TV channel. Generally, the user interface defaults to
highlighting one of these cells (e.g., the first recommended
video). Pressing “SELECT” on the Roku remote immediately
after the app has launched will therefore result in playback of
some content. From this insight, we devised a simple algo-
rithm that attempts to cause playback of three different videos
for each installed Roku app. Due to lack of space, we only pro-
vide an overview below, but we plan to make the tool publicly
available. The algorithm utilizes the Roku External Control
Protocol (ECP) API [42] to mimic a user’s interaction with
each Roku app. The ECP turns the Roku into an HTTP-server
with a REST-like API. The API includes an endpoint for each
key on the physical Roku remote. This allows us to send vir-
tual key presses to the Roku. We combine this with the ECP
endpoint that allows for querying the Roku device for its set of
installed apps, as well as the endpoint that launches a specific
app, to cycle through and exercise all installed apps.
Putting it all together. For each Roku app, the algorithm
first starts a packet capture so as to produce a .pcap file for
each Roku app, thereby essentially labeling traffic with the app
that caused it. Since Roku does not allow apps to execute in the
background (see “Roku Platform” earlier in this section), all
traffic captured during execution of a single app will belong to
that app and the Roku system. The target app is then launched,
and the algorithm pauses, waiting for the app to load. A virtual
“SELECT” key press is then sent to start video playback, and
the algorithm subsequently pauses for five minutes to let the
content play. The app is then relaunched by returning to the
Roku’s home screen and then launching the app again. A dif-
ferent video/live TV channel is then selected by sending a se-
quence of navigational key presses followed by a “SELECT”
key press, and the algorithm waits another five minutes for the
content to play. We perform two such relaunches, making the
total interaction time with each app approximately 16 minutes
(due to sleep timers).
4.2 Fire TV Data Collection
In this section, we first briefly describe the Fire TV platform.
We then describe Firetastic—our automated methodology for
systematically testing and collecting traffic from 1010 Fire TV
apps. The dataset reveals properties of ATS for Fire TV de-
vices and its analysis is deferred to Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Fire TV Platform. Although Fire TV is made by Amazon, its
underlying operating system, Fire OS, is a modified version
of Android. This allows apps for Fire TV to be developed in
a similar fashion to Android apps. Therefore, all third-party
libraries that are available for Android apps can also be in-
tegrated into Fire TV apps. Similarly, application sandboxing
and permissions in Fire TV are analogous to that of Android,
and any permission requested by the app is inherited by all li-
braries that the app includes. This allows third-party libraries
to track users across apps using a variety of identifiers, such
as Advertising ID, Serial Number, Device ID, and Account
Names, etc. We further discuss tracking through PII exposure
in Section 5.3.
App Selection. Amazon’s app store promotes apps with a cu-
rated list of Top Featured apps. Our data collection depends
on this list to determine the relevant applications to test for
Fire TV. Using the store’s web interface, which allows instal-
lations of apps in one click, we manually install 1010 apps
in batches of 50. Amazon’s app store had around 4,000 free
apps at the time of writing, thus our dataset covers approx-
imately 25%. Along the way, we ignore some apps that use
a local VPN, that could not be installed manually, and utility
apps that can change the device settings (which would affect
the test environment). As a result, we ignored around 200 apps
while collecting 1010 testable applications.
Automation (Firetastic). To scale testing of Fire TV apps, we
build a software tool, Firetastic, that integrates the capabilities
of two open source tools for Android: an SDK for network
traffic collection [43, 44] and a tool for input automation [45].
On-Device Network Traffic Collection. Since Fire TV is
based on Android, we can use existing Android tools to cap-
ture network traffic. Although there are various methods for
capturing traffic on Android on the smartTV device itself (e.g.
androidtcpdump [46]), most of them require a rooted de-
vice. While it is possible to root a Fire TV, it may make appli-
cations behave differently if they detect root. Thus, to collect
measurements that are representative of an average user, we
use a VPN-based traffic interception method that does not re-
quire rooting the device. Specifically, we used an open-source
VPN-based library [43, 44] to intercept all incoming and out-
going network traffic (including decrypting TLS connections)
from the Fire TV while labeling each packet with the package
name of the application that generated it. In addition, we mon-
itor network traffic from system applications to learn how the
device behaves with each different application.
App Exploration. To automatically explore each Fire TV
application, we utilize [45], a Python application that sends
commands to an Android device via the Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) to simulate inputs such as pressing buttons, in-
put text in a search box, or selecting a video to play. It does not
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require rooting the device and is easily customizable. This tool
is ideal for testing Fire TV applications because it treats each
application as a tree of possible paths to explore instead of ran-
domly generating events. We configured it to utilize its breadth
first search algorithm to explore each application, and ensure
various videos and ads would be played. Furthermore, we de-
duce that developers would minimize the necessary clicks in
order to reach the core sections of their applications, espe-
cially for playing video content. With some trial and error, we
selected the input command interval as three seconds which
leaves enough time for applications to handle the command
and load the next view during app exploration.
Putting it all together. In summary, Firetastic does the fol-
lowing for each app: (1) it starts the local VPN, (2) explores
the app for 15 minutes, (3) stops the local VPN, and (4) ex-
tracts the .pcapng files that were generated during testing.
We use Firetastic to do testing in parallel with six Fire TV de-
vices. Our test setup is resource-efficient and scalable: we use
only one computer to send commands to multiple (6 in our ex-
periments) Fire TV devices, and we are able to collect network
traffic data for 1010 apps within a one week period.
4.3 Comparing Roku and Fire TV
Overview. We start by summarizing the datasets collected us-
ing Rokustic and Firetastic in Table 2. Since these datasets
provide app-level granularity, we report the number of FQDNs
and URL paths that are contacted by one or multiple apps. For
Roku, we find 2191 distinct FQDNs, 699 of which are con-
tacted by more than one app. For Fire TV, we find 1734 dis-
tinct FQDNs, 603 of which are contacted by multiple apps.
We also find 578 FQDNs that appear in both datasets, 199 of
which are contacted by more than one app.
Categorizing Destinations. The app-level visibility also en-
ables us to categorize Internet destinations where packets are
sent to as first party, third party, or platform party, by compar-
ing that destination with the app that generated the packet. To
this end, we first map FQDNs to eSLDs using Mozilla’s Pub-
lic Suffix List [33, 34] and then categorize each eSLD as first
party, third party, or platform party as follows:
1. We first tokenize app identifiers and eSLDs. For Fire TV,
we tokenize the package names while relying on app and
developer names for Roku since its apps do not have pack-
age names.
2. We then match the app’s tokenized identifier against the
tokenized eSLD. In doing so, we ignore common tokens
or platform-specific strings like “com”, “firetv”, “roku”
“free”, “paid” etc. If the tokens match, we label the eSLD
as first party. If the tokens do not match, and if the eSLD
Number of Roku Fire TV Both
Apps exercised 1044 1010 128
Fully qualified domain names (FQDN) 2191 1734 578
FQDNs accessed by multiple apps 669 603 199
URL paths 13899 240713 74
Table 2. Summary of the Roku and Fire TV testbed datasets.
The rightmost column summarizes the intersection between the
two testbed datasets. For example, there are 128 apps that are
present both in the Roku dataset and the Fire TV dataset.
is contacted by at least two different apps (from different
developers), we label it as third party.
3. Finally, we label an eSLD as platform-specific party if it
originated from platform activity rather than app activity.
For Fire TV, the VPN Tool [43] labels connections with
the responsible process. For Roku, we simply check if the
eSLD contains the string “roku.”
Key Players. Figures 3a and 4a present the top-30 eSLDs in
terms of number of apps that contacted a subdomain of each
eSLD for each of the two platforms. We define an eSLD’s app
penetration as the percentage of apps in the dataset that contact
the eSLD. The top eSLD for both platforms have 100% app
penetration and belong to the platform operator. Alphabet has
a strong presence in the ATS space of both platforms, where
*.doubleclick.net, an ad delivery endpoint, achieves 58% and
35% app penetration for Roku and Fire TV, respectively. Its
analytic services such as google-analytics.com and crashlyt-
ics.com also rank high on both platforms.
Platform Activities. Figures 3b and 4b present the top-10
platform-specific FQDNs for Roku and Fire TV, respectively.
We note that both platforms use distinct advertising and track-
ing services. For Roku, subdomains of roku.com dominate,
with api.sr.roku.com and cooper.logs.roku.com being con-
tacted by all apps in our dataset. Roku devices are known to
contact log services every 30 seconds and initiate thousands
of DNS lookups daily if these FQDNs are blocked [47–49].
These services are also suspected of tracking Roku remote
key presses [50]. For Fire TV, subdomains of amazon.com,
amazonaws.com, and amazon-adsystem.com dominate. For
example, mobileanalytics.us-east-1.amazonaws.com [51] and
pinpoint.us-east-1.amazonaws.com [52] analytics endpoints
are contacted by 92% and 85% apps, respectively. Amazon
also dominates the advertising business on its own platform,
with aax-us-east.amazon-adsystem.com being contacted by
87% apps.
Third Party Advertising and Tracking Services (ATS). We
now seek to understand the third party ATS ecosystem when
we strip away the platform-specific endpoints, and how they
compare with the traditional mobile ATS ecosystem. Figs. 3c
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and 4c present the top-20 third party ATS endpoints for Roku
and Fire TV. We identify ATS endpoints by checking if a
FQDN is labeled as ads or tracking by VirusTotal, McAfee,
OpenDNS [53–55], or if it is blocked by any of the block lists
considered in Section 5. We note that both platforms use dis-
tinct third party ATS. For example, Fig. 3c shows that SpotX
(spotxchange.com), which serves video ads, is a significant
player in the Roku ATS space with 17% app penetration, but
only maintains 1% app penetration for Fire TV. Even when
considering the smaller players, we see little overlap between
the two platforms, suggesting these players focus their efforts
on a single platform. For example, Kantar Group’s insightex-
pressai.com analytics service has 7% app penetration on the
Roku platform, but only 0.01% on the Fire TV platform.
Comparing to Android ATS Ecosystem. Next, we compare
the top-20 third party ATS endpoints in our Roku and Fire TV
datasets (Figs. 3c and 4c) with those reported for Android [7].
Roku vs. Android. The key third party ATS players in
Roku (Fig. 3c) differ substantially from the Android plat-
form: the only overlapping FQDNs are Alphabet’s end-
points such as tpc.googlesyndication.com and subdomains of
doubleclick.net. While Alphabet has a strong foothold in both
Roku and Android ATS ecosystems, it is less significant for
Roku (9 out 20 of the top Roku third party ATS FQDNs
are Alphabet-owned, vs. 16 out of 20 for Android). Further-
more, Facebook is a key player in the Android ATS ecosys-
tem (graph.facebook.com is the second most popular ATS do-
main), but has close to zero ATS presence on the Roku plat-
form; while SpotX (*.spotxchange.com) has a strong presence
on Roku but is not among the key players for Android. Simi-
larly, comScore’s tracking service *.scorecardresearch.com is
a key player for Roku, but is absent for Android. In con-
trast to the top ATS for Android, the set of top third party
ATS in Roku is more diverse and includes smaller organiza-
tions such as Pixalate (adrta.com), Telaria (*.tremorhub.com),
Barons Media (ctv.monarchards.com), and The Trade Desk
(insight.adsrvr.org).
Fire TV vs. Android. In contrast to Roku, Fire TV is much
more similar to Android: we see an overlap of 9 FQDNs,
7 of which are owned by Alphabet. This is to be expected,
given that Fire TV is based off of Android, and thus na-
tively supports the ATS services of Android. For example, the
Alphabet-owned analytics service Crashlytics, which is sup-
ported on Android, iOS and Unity, is widely in use on both
Fire TV and Android, but is completely absent on Roku. In
contrast to Roku, Facebook (graph.facebook.com) and Ver-
izon (data.flurry.com) both have a strong presence on both
Fire TV and Android. Some of the third party ATS observed
for Fire TV, which were not present for Android, include com-
Fire TV
Roku
Adobe Systems
Alphabet
Amazon
Bain Capital
Barons Media
comScore
Facebook
Numitas
Oracle
PIxalate
RTL Group
Telaria
The Trade Desk
Unity Tech
Fig. 5. Mapping of Roku and Fire TV devices (testbed dataset) to
the parent organizations of the FQDNs they contact. The width of
an edge indicates the distinct number of apps that contact each
organization. The figure depicts organizations across devices that
contact them most, while also highlighting smaller companies that
only appear within each platform.
Score (*.scorecardresearch.com), Adobe (dpm.demdex.net),
and Amazon (applab-sdk.amazon.com).
Parent Organization Analysis. We further analyze the par-
ent organizations for Roku and Fire TV third party ATS end-
points in Fig. 5 using the method described earlier in Section 3.
Interestingly, the set of top third party organizations is rather
diverse, with only a slight overlap in the shape of Adobe Sys-
tems and comScore, possibly suggesting that the remaining
organizations focus their efforts on a single platform. Fire TV
shows Unity Tech and Facebook, suggesting that the platform
has more popular gaming and social applications. On the other
hand, Roku has more video content related ads being served
from the Trading Desk, Telaria, and RTL Group. Similar to in-
the-wild organization analysis in Fig 2, we again note that Al-
phabet dominates third party ATS on both Roku and Fire TV.
Takeaway. The key players of the Roku and Fire TV ATS
ecosystems differ substantially. For example, SpotX is a rela-
tively large player on Roku, but is almost absent from Fire TV.
In contrast, Facebook has almost zero presence on Roku, but
has a reasonable foothold on Fire TV. The exception is Alpha-
bet, which has a strong ATS presence on both platforms. The
key ATS players on Android have little overlap with Roku but
substantial overlap with Fire TV, which is built on top of An-
droid. Building on our findings, we present insights for identi-
fying platform-specific ATS endpoints in Section 5.
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Fig. 6. Top-60 common apps (apps present in both testbed datasets) ordered by the number of hostnames that each app contacts. Con-
sidering all common apps, there are 597 hostnames which are exclusive to Roku apps, 496 hostnames which are exclusive to Fire TV
apps, and 155 hostnames which are contacted by both the Roku and the Fire TV version of the same app.
4.4 Common Apps in Roku and Fire TV
Next, we compare the ATS ecosystems of Roku and Fire TV
at the app-level by analyzing the traffic generated by the set
of apps that appear on both platforms, referred to as common
apps. Recall from Table 2 that the datasets collected using
Rokustic and Firetastic contain a total of 128 common apps.
We identified common apps by fuzzy matching app names
since they sometimes vary slightly for each platform (e.g.,
“TechSmart.tv” on Roku vs. “TechSmart” on Fire TV). We
further cross-referenced with the developer’s name to validate
that the apps were indeed the same (e.g., both TechSmart apps
are created by “Future Today”).
We examine the overlapping and non-overlapping sets of
endpoints contacted by the common apps. The 128 common
apps contact a total of 1248 different FQDNs. Out of these,
597 FQDNs are exclusively contacted by Roku apps, 496 are
exclusively contacted by Fire TV apps, and only 155 FQDNs
are contacted by both Roku and Fire TV apps. These num-
bers already suggest that the two ecosystems differ substan-
tially even for the common apps.
Figure 6 reports overlapping and non-overlapping FQDN
for the top-60 common apps (in terms of the number of dis-
tinct FQDNs that each app contacts). In general, the set of
FQDNs contacted by both the Roku and the Fire TV versions
of the same app is much smaller than the set of platform-
specific FQDNs. From inspecting the common FQDNs for
the apps in Fig. 6, we find that these generally include end-
points that serve content. For example, for Mediterranean
Food, the only two common hostnames are subdomains of
ifood.tv, which belong to the parent organization behind the
app. This makes intuitive sense as the same app presumably
offers the same content on both platforms and must there-
fore access the same servers to download said content. On
the other hand, the platform-specific hostnames contain obvi-
ous ATS endpoints such as ads.yahoo.com and ads.stickyadstv.
com for the Roku version of the app, and aax-us-east.amazon-
adsystem.com and mobileanalytics.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
for the Fire TV version of the app. In conclusion, our analysis
of common apps that are present on both platforms reveals (to
our surprise) little overlap in the ATS endpoints they access,
which further highlights the distinct nature of the ATS ecosys-
tems of the two platforms.
5 Blocklists for Smart TVs
In this section, we are interested in detecting and mitigating
ATS in the smart TV ecosystem, using blocklists. First, we
evaluate four well-known DNS-based blocklists and demon-
strate their ineffectiveness in blocking traffic towards ATS
and preventing PII exfiltration, across different smart TV plat-
forms. Then, we provide insights and directions for improve-
ment of blocklist curation specifically for smart TVs.
5.1 Evaluating Popular DNS Blocklists
Note that unlike on-device blocking solutions that are read-
ily available for the desktop and mobile ecosystems [56], it is
generally not feasible to install ad/tracker blocking solutions
directly on smart TVs. DNS-based blocking solutions such as
Pi-hole [8] are typically used to block advertising and tracking
traffic from non-traditional devices in a smart home, includ-
ing smart TVs [57]. To block advertising and tracking traffic,
they essentially “blackhole” DNS requests to known advertis-
ing and tracking domains. Specifically, they match the domain
name in a DNS request against a set of blocklists that are es-
sentially curated hosts files that contain rules for well-known
advertising and tracking services. We note that the well-known
EasyList [58] contains regular expressions that do fine-grained
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matching against URLs in HTTP requests. In contrast, the
hosts files are limited to coarse-grained matching against do-
main names in DNS requests. If the domain name is found
in one of the blocklists, it is typically mapped to 0.0.0.0 or
127.0.0.1 to prevent outbound traffic to that domain [59].
Setup. We evaluate the following blocklists:
1. Pi-hole Default (PD): We test blocklists included in Pi-
hole’s default configuration [60] to imitate the experi-
ence of a typical Pi-hole user. This set has 7 hosts files
including Disconnect.me ads, Disconnect.me tracking,
hpHosts, CAMELEON, MalwareDomains, StevenBlack,
and Zeustracker. PD contains a total of about 133K en-
tries.
2. The Firebog (TF): We test the 9 advertising and 5 track-
ing blocklists recommended by “The Big Blocklist Col-
lection” [9] to imitate the experience of an advanced Pi-
hole user. This set not only includes most of the adver-
tising and tracking lists in Pi-hole’s default configuration
such as Disconnect.me ads and hpHosts, but also includes
a dedicated blocklist targeting smart TVs as well as hosts
versions of EasyList and EasyPrivacy. TF contains a total
of about 162K entries.
3. Mother of all Ad-Blocking (MoaAB): We test this cu-
rated hosts file [10] that targets a wide-range of unwanted
services including advertising, tracking, (cookies, page
counters, web bugs), and malware (phishing, spyware) to
again imitate the experience of an advanced Pi-hole user.
MoaAB contains a total of about 255K entries.
4. StopAd (SATV): We test a commercial smart TV focused
blocklist by StopAd [11]. This list particularly targets An-
droid based smart TV platforms such as Fire TV. We ex-
tract StopAd’s list by analyzing its APK using Android
Studio’s APK Analyzer [61]. StopAd contains a total of
about 3K entries.
We applied the aforementioned blocklists to both our in-the-
wild and testbed datasets, discussed in the previous sections,
and we report the results next.
Block Rates. We start our analysis by comparing how much
is blocked by different sets of blocklists. Table 3 compares
the block rates of the aforementioned blocklists on our in the
wild and testbed datasets. Overall, we note that TF, closely
followed by MoaAB and PD, blocks the highest fraction of
domains across all of the platforms in both in the wild and
testbed datasets. SATV is the distant last in terms of block
rate. It is noteworthy that TF blocks more hostnames than
MoaAB despite being about one-third shorter. Comparing TF
and MoaAB, we surmise that TF blocks more than MoaAB
despite being smaller because TF includes a smart TV focused
Block Rate (%)
Platform # Domains PD TF MoaAB SATV
Dataset obtained “in the wild”
Apple 3179 10% 13% 12% 5%
Samsumg 1765 14% 19% 15% 8%
Chromecast 1576 9% 15% 15% 5%
Roku 2312 15% 19% 18% 7%
Vizio 942 16% 18% 16% 11%
LG 627 45% 54% 50% 27%
Sony 119 16% 24% 16% 7%
Dataset obtained in our testbed
Roku 2191 17% 22% 20% 9%
Fire TV 1734 22% 27% 22% 9%
Table 3. Block rates of the four blocklists in our datasets.
hosts file. This finding shows that the size of a blocklist does
not necessarily translate to its coverage.
Blocklist Mistakes. Motivated by the differences in the block
rates of the four blocklists, we next compare them in terms of
false negatives (FN) and false positives (FP). False negatives
occur when a blocklist does not block requests to ATS and
may result in (visually observable) ads or (visually unobserv-
able) PII exfiltration. False positives occur when a blocklist
blocks requests that enable app functionality and may result in
(visually observable) app brekage.
We first systematically quantify visually observable false
positives and false negatives of blocklists by interacting with
a sample of apps from our testbed datasets and manually cod-
ing for presence of ads and app breakage. We sample 10 Roku
apps and 10 Fire TV apps, including the top-4 free apps, three
apps that are present on both platforms, and an additional three
randomly selected apps. We test each app five times: one time
without any blocklist and four times where we individually
deploy each of the aforementioned blocklists. During each ex-
periment, we attempt to trigger ads by playing multiple videos
and/or live TV channels and fast-forwarding through video
content, and we take note of any visually observable function-
ality breakage (due to false positives) and missed ATS (due
to false negatives). We differentiate between minor and major
functionality breakage as follows: minor breakage when the
app’s main content remains available but the application suf-
fers from minor user interface glitches or occasional freezes;
and major breakage when the app’s content becomes com-
pletely unavailable or the app fails to launch.
Functionality Breakage vs. Missed ATS. Table 4 summa-
rizes the results of our manual analysis for functionality break-
age and missed ads. No missed ads is indicated using a check
mark and missed ads is indicated using a cross. No breakage
is indicated using a check mark, minor breakage is indicated
using a cross, and major breakage is indicated using a bolded
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App Name No List PD TF MoaAB SATV
No
Ads
No
Break-
age
No
Ads
No
Break-
age
No
Ads
No
Break-
age
No
Ads
No
Break-
age
No
Ads
No
Break-
age
R
ok
u
C
om
m
on Pluto TV 5 5 5 5 5
iFood.tv 5 5
Tubi — 6
To
p
YouTube 5 5 5 5 5
CBS News Live 5 6 6 6
The Roku Channel 5 6 5
Sony Crackle 5 5 5 5
R
an
do
m WatchFreeComedyFlix 5 5 5
Live Past 100 Well
SmartWoman 5
Fi
re
TV
C
om
m
on Pluto TV 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
iFood.tv 5 — 6 — 6
Tubi
To
p
Downloader
The CW for Fire TV 5 — 6 — 6 — 6 5
FoxNow 5 — 6 — 6 5 5
Watch TNT
R
an
do
m KCRA3 Sacramento 5 — 6 — 6 5 5
Watch the Weather Channel 5 5
Jackpot Pokers by PokerStars 5
Table 4. Missed ATS and functionality breakage for different blocklists when employed during manual interaction with 10 Roku apps and
10 Fire TV apps. For “No Ads”, a checkmark ( ) indicates that no ads were shown during the experiment, a cross (5) indicates that
some ad(s) appeared during the experiment, and a dash (—) indicates that breakage prevented interaction with the app altogether. For
“No Breakage”, a checkmark ( ) indicates that the app functioned correctly, a cross (5) indicates minor breakage, and a bold cross (6)
indicates major breakage.
cross. Overall, we find that none of the blocklists are able to
block ads from all of the sampled apps while avoiding break-
age. In particular, none of the blocklists are able to block ads in
YouTube and Pluto TV (available on both Roku and Fire TV).
Across different lists, PD seems to achieve the best balance
between blocking ads and preserving functionality.
For Roku, PD and TF perform similarly. While TF is the
only list that blocks ads in Sony Crackle, both lists miss ads
in YouTube and Pluto TV. TF majorly breaks three apps while
PD only majorly breaks one app. MoaAB is unable to block
ads in four apps and majorly breaks only one app. SATV does
not cause any breakage but is unable to block ads in six apps.
For Fire TV, PD again seems to be the most effective at
blocking ads while avoiding breakage, but is still unable to
block ads in one app (Pluto TV) and majorly breaks two apps.
TF is also unable to block ads in Pluto TV, but majorly breaks
four apps. MoaAB is unable to block ads in three apps and ma-
jorly breaks three apps (one minor). SATV is unable to block
ads in four apps and majorly breaks one app (two minor).
Takeaway. Unfortunately, all blocklists suffer from a non-
trivial amount of visually observable false positives and false
negatives. Some blocklists (e.g., PD and TF) are clearly more
effective than others. Interestingly, SATV, which is curated
specifically for smart TVs, did not perform well.
5.2 Beyond Domains
In this section, we look at ATS characteristics beyond just the
destination domains. In particular, we observe that the more
apps that contact a single destination, the more likely it is for
that destination to be an ATS. This is intuitive and consis-
tent with a similar observation previously made in the mobile
ecosystem [7]. This observation may also aid blocklist cura-
tors in identifying candidate block rules.
We first use simple keywords such as “ad”, “ads” and
“tracking” to shortlist obvious ATS domains in our datasets.
While keyword search is not perfect, this simple approach
identified several obvious false negatives, a few of which
are shown in Table 5. For example, p.ads.roku.com and
adtag.primetime.adobe.com are advertising/tracking related
domains which are not blocked by any of the lists. A few do-
mains such as ads.samba.tv are only blocked by the TF block
list. Finally, data.ad-score.com is blocked by PD and TF, but
not MoaAB and SATV.
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Hostname PD TF MoaAB SATV
p.ads.roku.com 5 5 5 5
ads.aimitv.com 5 5 5 5
adtag.primetime.adobe.com 5 5 5 5
ads.adrise.tv 5 5 5
ads.samba.tv 5 5 5
tracking.sctv1.monarchads.com 5 5 5
data.ad-score.com 5 5
Table 5. Examples of false negatives for the four DNS-based
blocklists found using keywords searches.
We observe that many of these false negatives (i.e., missed
ATS domains) are contacted by multiple apps in our testbed
datasets. For example, p.ads.roku.com is accessed by more
than 100 apps in our Roku testbed dataset. To gain further in-
sight into potential false negatives, we study whether the like-
lihood of being blocked is impacted by the number of apps
that access a particular domain. Figure 7 plots the block rates
for the union of the four blocklists as a function of FQDNs’
occurrences across apps in our testbed datasets. We note that
the block rate of a domain substantially increases as it starts
to appear across multiple apps. For example, a domain’s block
rate almost doubles when it is contacted by multiple apps. Do-
mains that are contacted by multiple different apps are there-
fore more likely to belong to third party ATS libraries included
by smart TV apps.
5.3 PII Exposures
In this section, we consider exposure of personally identifiable
information (PII) and we evaluate the effectiveness of block-
lists in preventing that. We define “PII exposure” as the trans-
mission of any PII from the smart TV device to any Internet
destination. We identify PIIs (such as advertising ID and serial
number) through each platform’s settings menus and packag-
ing. Since trackers are known to encode or hash PIIs [62], we
compute the MD5 and SHA1 hashes for each of the PII values.
We then search for these PIIs in the HTTP headers and URI.
Some PII exposures may be legitimate, in the sense that
the user may have given permission to the app to access the
PII and the network; or that the PII sent by the app is needed
for the functionality of the app. For example, Roku apps may
use PII to enable personalized content in the absence of lo-
gins. However, third party (ATS) libraries automatically in-
herit app permissions and may use PII for tracking unrelated
to app functionality. For example, in Fire TV, we observed ex-
amples where static PIIs (serial number) are sent alongside dy-
namic ones (advertising ID), which allows re-linking of users
to dynamic PIIs (even after they have been reset).
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Fig. 7. Block rates as a function of the number apps that con-
tact an FQDN. For the horizontal axis, “2+” represents the set of
FQDNs that are contacted by 2 or more apps. For Roku, the more
apps that contact an FQDN, the more likely it is that that FQDN
is an ATS, according to the blocklists. The same is not true for
Fire TV because platform services start to dominate the set of
FQDNs, and platform services are often not blocked.
As a first step for distinguishing between “good” or ”bad”
PII transmission (which is a problem on its own and out of
scope for this paper), we adopt a simple approach similar
to [56] that treats data exfiltration to third parties as a higher
threat to privacy. We further distinguish between PII sent to
first party, third party, and platform services, as defined in
Sec. 4.3. PII sent to first parties are generally warranted as they
have functional purposes such as personalization of content
(e.g., keep track of where the user paused a video or serve con-
tent specific to the user’s region). On the other hand, PII sent
to third parties do not typically have a functional purpose. This
extends to cases where the app retrieves its content through a
third party CDN as the personalization could be achieved by
first sending the PII to the first party server which could then
respond to the app with the CDN URL for the content to be
retrieved.
Table 6 reports the number of PII exposures found in our
Roku and Fire TV testbed datasets. Recall from Section 4 that
we can analyze HTTP information even for encrypted flows
in Fire TV, but can only analyze unencrypted flows in Roku.
Thus, we are able to observe more PII exposures for Fire TV
than Roku, which results in higher numbers on the right than
on the left side of Table 6.
For Roku, we observe that the device’s serial number is
often exposed to first and third parties. When sent to first par-
ties, this identifier can enable personalization as many Roku
apps do not require login. The blocklists seem to capture this
functional purpose well: the block rates for serial number are
very low (8%), when it is sent to first parties, and much higher
(73%) when it is sent to third parties. There are very few ex-
posures of serial number to the platform, none of which is
captured by the blocklists. Upon closer inspection, we found
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PII Roku Testbed Dataset Fire TV Testbed Dataset
First Party Third Party Platform Total First Party Third Party Platform Total
Advertising ID 1899 (91%) 2896 (98%) 0 4853 (94%) 408 (21%) 1507 (81%) 7648 (8%) 9575 (20% )
Serial Number 743 (8%) 1095 (73%) 31 (0%) 1897 (46%) 157 (0%) 2864 (2.6%) 10411 (0%) 13450 (0.6%)
Device ID 0 0 0 0 728 ( 0%) 2311 (35%) 8578 (0%) 13302 (7%)
Account Name 6 (33%) 0 0 8 (25%) 2 (0%) 52 (100%) 1 (0%) 55 (95%)
MAC Address 0 0 0 0 0 38 (100%) 0 38 (100%)
Location 55 (100%) 40 (100%) 0 95 (100%) 0 225 (99%) 12 (100%) 237 (99%)
Table 6. Number of Exposures (% Blocked): Number of times that a PII was exposed and the percentage of times that the exposure was
successfully blocked by at least one blocklist. We report the total number of PII exposures found in our testbed datasets, and we further
distinguish w.r.t. the packet’s destination being first party, third party or platform related, as defined in Sec. 4.3.
that these platform exposures originate from the flickr app (de-
veloped by Roku) and go to rokucom-link.appspot.com. They
seem to link the Roku device with the flickr service for analyt-
ics purposes as the URI path “/getRegResult?...” encodes the
PII alongside Roku as a partner and flickr as the service.
In contrast, for Fire TV, blocklists are unable to block
third party exposures of more prevalent PIIs such as serial
number (only 2.6% blocked) and device ID (35%) while per-
forming well for advertising ID (81%). While exposure of
serial number or device ID may be utilized for software up-
dates, we discover that they are multipurpose, as the vast ma-
jority of these exposures to Amazon-owned endpoints go to
aviary.amazon.com with a URI path of “/GetAds”. Further-
more, these two hardwired identifiers are often sent alongside
the advertising ID, which allows third parties to associate an
old advertising ID (users can reset their advertising ID) to the
new value by joining on serial number and device ID.
Leveraging Missed PII Exposures to Improve Blocklists.
The unblocked PII exposures indicate another direction for
improving blocklist curation for smart TVs. By deploying
tools such as Rokustic and Firetastic and searching the net-
work traces for PIIs, blocklist curators can generate candi-
date rules that can then be examined manually. Using this ap-
proach, we identified 38 domains in the Roku dataset and 30
in the Fire TV dataset that receive PII, but were not blocked
by any list. These numbers are conservative as we exclude
location and account name that are likely to be used for le-
gitimate purposes, such as logging in or serving location-
based content. These domains include obvious ATS such as
ads.aimitv.com and ads.ewscloud.com. Another noteworthy
mention is hotlist.samba.tv: Samba TV uses Automatic Con-
tent Recognition to provide content suggestions on smart TVs,
but this comes at the cost of targeted advertising that even
propagates onto other devices in the home network [63].
6 Conclusion & Directions
In this paper, we performed a comprehensive measurement
study of the smart TV advertising and tracking services (ATS)
ecosystem. While smart TV platforms are becoming increas-
ingly popular, their ATS ecosystems have not yet received
as much attention from the privacy community as the ATS
ecosystems of the mobile platform and the web. To that end,
we analyzed and compared: (i) a realistic but small in-the-
wild dataset (57 smart TV devices of 7 different platforms,
with coarse flow-level information) and (ii) two large testbed
datasets (top-1000 apps on Roku and Fire TV, tested system-
atically, with granular per app and packet-level information).
We showed that smart TVs generate a substantial amount
of traffic towards ATS. Our results also revealed that adver-
tising and tracking is platform-specific; even common apps
across different platforms tend to contact more platform-
specific than common domains. Our evaluation of four sets
of state-of-the-art DNS blocklists for smart TVs showed vary-
ing block rates, with all lists suffering from both false posi-
tives (resulting in functionality breakage) and false negatives
(resulting in missed ads and trackers). Even the commercial
StopAd designed for smart TVs did not work well. We demon-
strated that these blocklists are less effective in blocking PII
sent to platform endpoints than to third parties, both of which
perform tracking in smart TVs. Finally, we offered two in-
sights to help blocklist curators identify false negatives, i.e.,
domains that are contacted by multiple apps or domains that
collect PII.
In summary, our work establishes that (i) the smart TV
ATS ecosystem is fragmented across different smart TV plat-
forms; (ii) the smart TV ATS ecosystem is different from the
mobile ATS ecosystem; and (iii) DNS-based blocklists are cur-
rently not able to effectively filter ATS for smart TVs. These
findings motivate more research to further understand smart
TVs and to develop privacy-enhancing solutions specifically
designed for each smart TV platform. For example, more re-
search is needed to curate accurate, fine-grained (compared
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to DNS-based), and platform-specific blocklists. To foster fur-
ther research along this direction, we plan to make our tools,
Rokustic and Firetastic, and datasets from testing the top-1000
Roku and Fire TV apps publicly available.
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Fig. 8. Continuation of Fig. 1 from Sec. 3: top-30 fully qualified
domain names in terms of number of flows per device for the re-
maining devices in the in-the-wild dataset.
